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POUND OF FLESH? DEBT CONTRACT STRICTNESS AND FAMILY FIRMS 
 
ABSTRACT 
While past work finds support for both higher and lower cost of debt among family firms, 
whether lower shareholder±creditor agency conflicts in family firms translate into greater ex-
ante contracting efficiency (i.e., lower debt contract strictness) remains unexplored. Drawing 
on a shareholder±creditor agency framework and costly contracting theory, creditors, 
expecting firm value maximization rather than shareholder value maximization from family 
firms, may offer less strict debt contracts to increase contracting efficiency. We find in a 
sample of 716 publicly traded US firms (2001±2010) that family firms have less strict debt 
contracts, which are even less strict when family firms have higher asset tangibility. Although 
increases in R&D investments could lead to more pronounced shareholder±creditor agency 
conflicts, given family firmV¶ preferences for lower risk and growth, debt contract strictness 
among family firms is not positively associated with higher R&D intensity. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate debt contracts include incentives and penalties coupled with monitoring 
mechanisms to limit asset substitution and overinvestment. The aspects of debt contract 
strictness range from dividend policies to restrictions on risk-shifting investments (Frankel, 
Seethamraju, & Zach, 2008) and allow creditors to set parameters on resource allocations and 
maintain necessary liquidity. When a covenant is violated, control rights may shift to 
creditors, which allow them to intervene in corporate decisions.1 
However, with increasing debt contract strictness, monitoring and enforcing debt 
covenants is costly. Based on the logic of contracting efficiency, when creditors perceive 
greater goal alignment with shareholders, debt contract strictness could be lowered to 
economize on contracting costs (Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990; Frankel et al., 2008; Holthausen 
& Leftwich, 1983). Tying the logic of contracting efficiency with the previous literature in 
family business research, debt related contracting costs could be lower or higher in family 
firms. 
                                                          
1 At the root of shareholder±FUHGLWRU DJHQF\ FRQIOLFW LV WKH VKDUHKROGHUV¶ LQFHQWLYH WR Sromote investment in 
risky, high-returns projects. Expecting ex-post hazard of expropriation from shareholders, creditors demand a 
higher cost for debt and/or ex ante impose stricter debt contracts. 
3 
On the one hand, interests of family firms align with those of the creditors. Due to 
their less diversified holdings2 family firms focus on firm value maximization instead of 
shareholder value maximization. Family firms have a lower preference for risky high-growth 
investments, are parsimonious and particularistic in allocating debt funds (Carney, 2005), are 
characterized by intentions for transgenerational continuity (Chrisman, Sharma, Steier, & 
Chua, 2013), and are concerned about preserving reputation (Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, & 
Larraza-Kintana, 2010) and social capital (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007). On the other 
hand, due to their preference for private benefits of control (Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 
2003), they run the risk of entrenchment and nepotism (Friedman, Johnson, & Mitton, 2003; 
Pérez-González, 2006) and their interests and goals may not align with those of creditors 
(Aslan & Kumar, 2012). 
Consistent with mixed theoretical propositions on shareholder±creditor agency costs 
in family firms, empirical findings are also mixed (Gottardo & Moisello, 2016). Prior 
research shows that family firms have either a lower (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003) or 
similar (McConaughy, 1999) cost of debt compared to non-family firms. Conversely, 
illiquidity premium associated with family ownership (Aronoff, Ward, & De Visscher, 1995) 
can increase the cost of capital. Reconciling the findings on positive, negative, and neutral 
effects of family influence on the cost of capital, Adams et al. (2004) propose that this cost is 
contingent on the degree of integrated goal-setting in family firms. 
Given the competing theoretical arguments for lower and higher shareholder±creditor 
agency costs in family firms and mixed empirical evidence on ex-post contracting 
mechanisms (i.e., the cost of debt), the question of whether creditors still maintain stricter 
                                                          
2 Note that we focus on publicly traded firms in the United States, which are likely to be less diversified. 
Although studies that investigate corporate control in developing and Asian countries (Bertrand, Johnson, 
Samphantharak, & Schoar, 2008; Bertrand, Mehta, & Mullainathan, 2000) highlight the pyramidal structures 
and tunneling practices of family firms in highly diversified conglomerates, publicly traded US firms are less 
diversified. 
4 
debt covenants to monitor and control family firms or economize on monitoring and control 
costs with family firms remains to be answered. 
We pose two additional questions. First, do creditors have even less strict debt 
contracts for family firms with higher asset tangibility? Less transparent family firms may be 
difficult to monitor, and asset tangibility helps to reduce information asymmetry and improve 
monitoring (Almeida & Campello, 2007; Céspedes, González, & Molina, 2010). Second, do 
creditors allow loss-averse family firms to make risky R&D investments by not increasing 
debt contract strictness? If the lower shareholder±creditor agency costs expected in family 
firms are confirmed, both creditors and family firms could forbear to lower contracting 
frictions. FRUEHDUDQFHRQWKHFUHGLWRU¶VVLGHFDQEHDVVHVVHGE\DQRQ-significant (significant) 
increase in debt contract strictness despite increases in R&D in family (non-family) firms.3 
The proposed framework makes the following two contributions. First, we contribute 
to financial economics research by identifying differences in contracting efficiency between 
family and non-family firms in corporate debt markets (Chava, Kumar, & Warga, 2010; 
Gigler, Kanodia, Sapra, & Venugopalan, 2009). Second, taking a contracting efficiency 
approach, we investigate the shareholder±creditor agency problem, which ³KDVEHHQODUJHO\
absent [in] WKHILQDQFHOLWHUDWXUHDERXWIDPLO\ILUPV´(Villalonga, Amit, Trujillo, & Guzmán, 
2015, p. 635). 
 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
Family firm research has grown both theoretically and empirically over the past three decades 
(Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & De Castro, 2011; Pindado & Requejo, 2015). Agency 
theory has been central to family firm literature. Family firms have agency problems between 
shareholders and managers (Agency Problem 1), family shareholders and non-family 
                                                          
3 If creditors expect lower asset substitution from family firms, they will not increase debt contract strictness 
despite higher R&D in family firms, knowing that family firms with more efficient R&D (Duran, 
Kammerlander, Van Essen, & Zellweger, 2015) will not undertake such risk level that could lower firm value. 
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shareholders (Agency Problem 2), shareholders and creditors (Agency Problem 3), and 
family shareholders and family non-shareholders (Agency Problem 4) (Villalonga et al., 
2015). Agency Problem 3, proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977) and 
Smith and Warner (1979), is one of the less-discussed agency problems in the family firm 
literature (for exceptions, see Anderson et al., 2003; Boubakri & Ghouma, 2010; Chua, 
Chrisman, Kellermanns, & Wu, 2011). 
Under the shareholder±creditor agency conflict (Agency Problem 3), risk-shifting 
concerns for creditors are asset substitution (i.e., managers accept higher-risk projects than 
anticipated by creditors) and overinvestment (i.e., managers invest in negative net present 
value projects). To curb expected shareholder±creditor agency costs, creditors significantly 
increase debt costs, reduce availability of credit, and/or impose stricter terms. However, both 
family business literature and normative agency theory suggest mixed arguments and 
evidence for family firms, so that their shareholder±creditor agency costs could be lower or 
higher. 
Lower Shareholder±Creditor Agency Costs in Family Firms. The interests of family 
owners, who are concentrated shareholders with preference for firm value maximization over 
shareholder value maximization, may align with those of their creditors. Poutziouris (2002) 
finds that a majority of family firms avoid any source of finance that lowers family 
ownership and control, and Romano, Tanewski, and Smyrnios (2001) document the 
preference for debt and leasing arrangements of family owners who want to retain control of 
the business. Croci, Doukas, and Gonenc (2011); Wiwattanakantang (1999), Lee (2006), and 
King and Santor (2008), among others, show that family firms are more leveraged than non-
family firms. Family firms are expected to be good stewards with debt and to be particularly 
diligent when complying with debt commitments (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004). 
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Past work also shows that family firms have a lower preference for risky, high-growth 
investments, including internationalization and acquisitions (for a review, see Gedajlovic, 
Carney, Chrisman, & Kellermanns, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011), and their long-term 
orientation could also improve debt management and capital structure (Casson, 1999). Family 
firms are less likely to increase asset substitution or overinvestment as such actions could 
jeopardize their own undiversified holdings, endanger their transgenerational intentions, and 
lower their reputational capital (Arregle et al., 2007; Berrone et al., 2010). Indirectly 
supporting this logic, Anderson et al. (2003) find that public family firms in the United States 
have a lower cost of debt. 
Higher Shareholder±Creditor Agency Costs in Family Firms. Expecting opacity 
(Anderson, Duru, & Reeb, 2009) and limited power in restructuring debt through negotiations 
with concentrated owners in a family firm (Hart & Moore, 1994), creditors may construe 
shareholder±creditor agency costs to be greater and increase debt contract strictness. 
Examples of preference for private benefits of control over creditors¶ LQWHUHVWV is evident in 
tunneling (e.g., Friedman et al., 2003; Jiang, Lee, & Yue, 2010), entrenchment (e.g., Shyu & 
Lee, 2009), and underinvestment practices (e.g., Jain & Shao, 2014). Supporting this logic, 
family firms may have higher debt costs (Lin, Ma, Malatesta, & Xuan, 2011), lower bond 
ratings, and higher bond-yield spreads (Boubakri & Ghouma, 2010). Given the mixed 
evidence on the severity of shareholder±creditor agency costs in family firms, whether 
creditors prefer stricter or more lenient debt contracts when lending to this type of company 
remains an open question. 
 
Debt Contract Strictness and Family Firms 
Because asset substitution and overinvestment are less likely in family firms, creditors expect 
lower agency problems and prefer imposing less strict debt contracts to reduce contracting 
frictions (cf. David, O'Brien, & Yoshikawa, 2008; Uzzi, 1999) for at least two reasons: (i) to 
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increase alignment of incentives between family owners and creditors to maximize firm value 
(instead of shareholder value); and (ii) to avoid excessive monitoring costs, which make 
highly restrictive contracts less efficient in family firms. 
Cautious and long-term oriented family firms with less diversified holdings are more 
conservative in resource allocations and have limited propensity to take risks (Gedajlovic et 
al., 2012). Despite lower power in debt restructuring in case of default and difficulty in 
monitoring due to higher opacity, debtors can reduce contracting and monitoring costs by 
relying on publicly available volatility indices (Demerjian, 2011). Because family firm 
conservatism induces lower volatility ratios and such ratios are observable, contracting costs 
should be lower for public family firms. Due to possible goal alignment between creditors 
and family owners (cf. Gigler et al., 2009) and as a result of better asset utilization and 
efficiency (Chen & Hsu, 2009), family firms also have a comparative advantage over non-
family firms in corporate debt markets. 
With respect to lower need for monitoring, stricter debt contracts imply increased 
information gathering and higher monitoring costs (Emanuel, Wong, & Wong, 2003; 
Holthausen, 1990). Contracting efficiency helps to ³ILOOJDSVFRUUHFWHUURUVDQGDGDSWPRUH
HIIHFWLYHO\ WR XQDQWLFLSDWHG GLVWXUEDQFHV´ (Williamson, 1988: 570) to reduce frictions in 
contracting costs (Wang & Williamson, 1998). As indication of lower need for monitoring, 
family firms are conservative in their reporting of financial performance (Ali, Chen, & 
Radhakrishnan, 2007; Prencipe, Markarian, & Pozza, 2008; Wang, 2006), exhibit timely loss 
recognition, and limit income smoothing (Prencipe et al., 2008). They also have higher 
earnings quality (Wang, 2006) and are more likely to warn about bad news (Ali et al., 2007). 
Concerns for family reputation lower incentives to compromise their standing in the 
corporate debt market, further reducing monitoring needs (Fehr, Brown, & Zehnder, 2009). 
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Counterintuitively, stricter debt contracts through greater collateralization, shorter 
maturity, and more financial covenants (e.g., times over net worth, current ratio, total debt, 
and interest coverage covenants) may not necessarily lower shareholder±creditor agency 
costs but may increase diffidence in family firm. Leverage reduces potential for future growth 
(Lang, Ofek, & Stulz, 1996) and costly debt FDQ FUHDWH ³RYHUKDQJ´ from debt contract 
strictness that can lead family firms to underinvest. 
Overall, compared to non-family firms (where managers have asymmetric incentives 
to underplay bad news, higher risk preference, and short-term orientation), in corporate debt 
markets, family firms may be perceived by creditors as having greater contracting efficiency. 
Therefore, we propose our first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1. Debt contract strictness is lower in public family firms than in public 
non-family firms. 
 
The strong correlation between performance of tangible assets and debt payments 
(Almeida & Campello, 2007) could be an important signal for creditors, thereby contributing 
to increased contracting efficiency with family firms. Gompers (1995) VWDWHV ³Tangible 
assets lower expected agency cRVWV RI LQHIILFLHQW FRQWLQXDWLRQ´ p. 1477).4 Contracting 
frictions may be significantly higher if the tangibility of assets is lower (Campello & 
Giambona, 2011). 
Increasing asset tangibility can make uncertainty or errors in assessment of 
shareholder±creditor agency costs more forgiving for less transparent family firms (cf. 
Bianco, Bontempi, Golinelli, & Parigi, 2013). The more resources a firm has tied into 
tangible assets, the lower the information asymmetry is present in collateral valuation or debt 
restructuring. Tunneling behavior can be readily observed and firm opacity can be reduced 
with higher asset tangibility (cf. Almeida & Campello, 2007; Graham, Li, & Qiu, 2008; 
Whittred & Zimmer, 1986). Wen, Rwegasira, and Bilderbeek (2002) find that asset 
                                                          
4 Asset tangibility is measured as the ratio of tangible and fungible assets to total assets (Hall, 2012). 
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uniqueness increases the need for greater tangibility. As family firms have unique and 
idiosyncratic resources that have evolved over generations (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003), indirectly 
supporting Hall (2012) argument, higher asset tangibility could mitigate concerns from 
outsiders in evaluating and monitoring business activities. 
Tangible assets also lend themselves more readily to particularism and personalism 
(Carney, 2005) as task, tool, and process relationships related with these assets are more 
clearly defined. Furthermore, family firms with higher asset tangibility rely less on branding 
and intellectual property and focus more on improving efficiency (McConaughy, Walker, 
Henderson, & Mishra, 1998). Family firms have a higher input±output conversion ratio 
(Erbetta, Menozzi, Corbetta, & Fraquelli, 2013; Lehmann, Warning, & Weigand, 2004) and 
are more likely to revitalize, reconfigure, and realign their tangible resources (Sirmon & Hitt, 
2003). This capability is more appealing to creditors as continued vitality of tangible assets 
ensures smoother debt payments. 
Overall, asset tangibility could increase contracting efficiency for both family and 
non-family firms, but more so for family firms. While non-family firms may allow for greater 
external oversight and for more inputs from external blockholders, greater tangibility may not 
lower agency costs as debt contracts may already account for lower opacity (Anderson et al., 
2009; Bianco et al., 2013) in non-family firms. The higher cost of debt in non-family 
companies can act as a disciplining mechanism that lowers reliance on additional signals 
related to tangible assets. Furthermore, with limited idiosyncratic assets compared to family 
firms, the nature of assets could be more easily evaluated in non-family firms (Lin & Shen, 
2015), lowering debt contract concessions for these firms. 
Based on these arguments and considering the previous reasoning leading to 
Hypothesis 1, we propose our second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2. As asset tangibility increases, debt contract strictness becomes lower in 
public family firms than in public non-family firms. 
10 
 
R&D expenditures have a longer time horizon to fruition and the associated returns 
are generally uncertain and skewed (Kothari, Laguerre, & Leone, 2002). Given the mixed 
theoretical arguments and empirical findings on the preference of family firms for R&D and 
the possibility of asset substitution associated with this type of investment, the question that 
remains is whether creditors should impose stricter debt covenants on public family firms in 
the face of increasing R&D. 
Expecting lower shareholder±creditor agency costs, creditors will forbear and not 
increase debt contract strictness even when family firms increase R&D intensity due to lower 
risk of asset substitution. Knowing that R&D investment exacerbates shareholder±creditor 
agency costs and lowers contracting efficiency, family firms will also forbear and not 
overinvest in R&D. Creditors may infer that family firms will not increase firm risk 
significantly as such behavior can jeopardize the concentrated wealth of family owners.5 We 
expect that creditors do not increase debt contract strictness when family firms increase R&D 
WRDOORZIRU³EUHDWKLQJURRP´IRUIDPLO\ILUPVWRSXUVXHLQQRYDWLRQ 
Forbearing Behavior from Creditors. Creditors focus on both facilitating6 and 
limiting violations of debt covenants through stricter contracts (Nini, Smith, & Sufi, 2012). 
Not forbearing with family firms could impose economic and socioemotional costs and 
increase underinvestment, rendering a family firm at a competitive disadvantage. As family 
firms have long-term economic and non-economic wealth tied to the firm, the cost of 
forbearing may not be high for creditors (cf. Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, 
& Moyano-Fuentes, 2007). 
Forbearing Behavior from Family Firms. )DPLO\ RZQHUV¶ FRQFHUQ for long-term 
performance and reputation allows creditors to trust that R&D levels will not rise to asset 
                                                          
5 The proposed forbearance is not related to relational debt types present in some countries (e.g., Japan; David et 
al., 2008; O'Brien, 2003) that allows creditors to facilitate R&D through intensive monitoring. 
6 Such behavior results in necessary contractual slack for family firms to pursue opportunities so the underlying 
collateral assets are not jeopardized. 
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substitution levels (cf. David et al., 2008). Restraint among family firms from pursuing 
growth opportunities that increase firm risk acts as an implicit check for creditors against 
such costs. Also, concern for reputation and the deep social ties of family firms create 
continuing relationships in the debt market, which lower moral hazard problems related to 
excessive R&D. Greater volatility from higher R&D investment is a concern for non-family 
firms because it exacerbates shareholder±creditor agency costs. Conversely, general 
diffidence toward (Bertrand et al., 2000; Block, 2012) and efficiency in (Duran et al., 2015) 
R&D investment in family firms is sufficient to suggest to creditors that higher debt strictness 
with increasing R&D will exacerbate contracting costs and jeopardize collateral assets in the 
long term. Based on this rationale, we propose our third hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3. As R&D intensity increases, debt contract strictness does not increase 
in public family firms but does increase for public non-family firms. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data 
The initial data set consists of the US firms available in Compustat. We exclude regulated 
public utilities (SIC codes 4812, 4813, and 4911±4991), financial firms (SIC codes 6020±
6799), foreign firms, firms listed as master limited partnerships, and firms with no available 
total assets or share price of less than $0.25. Firms are classified into family and non-family 
using the information provided by Anderson et al. (2009) and Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao 
(2012).7 The time period covered ranges from 2001 to 2010. To control for survivorship bias, 
we allow firms to exit or enter the sample. The resulting sample is then merged with the 
December 2012 update of the Loan Pricing CorporDWLRQ¶V'HDO6can Database, which includes 
historic data on the private loan agreements of 67,669 US companies collated from SEC 
filings (e.g., Dichev & Skinner, 2002) or /RDQ 3ULFLQJ &RUSRUDWLRQ¶V own data-gathering 
                                                          
7 The percentage of family firms in the final sample is 27.68%. 
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process.8 When defining our debt contract strictness measure, we consider information on 
private covenants as opposed to just bond covenants because private loans dominate the 
market for corporate debt (e.g., Bagnoli, Liu, & Watts, 2011) and private debt usually 
includes more restrictive covenants than public debt contracts (e.g., Mather & Peirson, 2006). 
We merge the databases using the ticker symbol and the company name to obtain a 
sample of 1,766 companies. We drop companies that do not have a coverage covenant in 
their debt contract or do not have at least six consecutive periods of data, which we need to 
compute the m2 statistic, necessary to test for the absence of second-order serial correlation in 
the first difference residuals when using the generalized method of moments. The final 
sample is an unbalanced panel of 716 companies (14,904 firm-quarter observations) from 
2001 to 2010. 
 
Estimation Method 
Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity with the panel data methodology is important as it 
can affect contract strictness. In addition, we account for endogeneity, which stems from 
correlation between the error term and the explanatory variables. This correlation violates one 
of the main assumptions of the ordinary least squares method. To address this problem, we 
use an instrumental variables method adequate for a panel data setting: the system 
generalized method of moments, which embeds all other instrumental variables estimators as 
special cases. 
Several specification tests are computed in the estimation process. First, we calculate 
the Hansen statistic, which tests for the lack of correlation between the instruments and the 
random disturbance. Second, we compute the m2 statistic, derived by Arellano and Bond 
(1991), to test for the lack of second order serial correlation in the first difference residuals. 
                                                          
8 Panel B of Table 1 shows that debt contract components exhibit variation over time for the same company (see 
within component of the standard deviation of each dimension of the debt contract strictness index). 
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Finally, we use three Wald tests to check for the joint significance of the reported coefficients 
(z1), the temporal dummy variables (z2), and the industry dummy variables (z3). 
 
Dependent Variable 
We define an index of contract strictness using information from the DealScan database. The 
debt contract strictness index (DCSI) is based on eight debt contract features and ranges from 
zero to eight, with higher values of the index meaning a stricter contract. The eight debt 
contract features are the amount borrowed, whether the contract is secured, whether it is a 
revolver loan, the distribution method, the amount a borrower pays in basis points over 
LIBOR for each dollar drawn down, the number of lenders, maturity, and the number of 
covenants.9 We consider a contract to be stricter if the amount borrowed, the price of the 
loan, the number of lenders, and the number of covenants is higher than the sample median; if 
it is a secured or a syndicated loan; if it is not a revolver loan; or if the maturity of the loan is 
lower than the sample median. For each of these characteristics, we give the value of 1 if the 
characteristic is strict, and zero otherwise, and then we sum the eight values. Panels A and B 
of Table 1 detail the components of the index and their summary statistics, respectively. 
-----Insert Table 1 Here----- 
 
Predictor Variables 
Panel C of Table 1 provides definitions of the family firm, moderator, and control variables. 
For a control, we use ROA, a measure of efficiency that can lower the DCSI. Larger firms 
require higher amount of financing than smaller firms, which makes the debt contract more 
complex and stricter. Given that larger firms need to be monitored more closely, we control 
for firm size. Higher debt levels can increase contract strictness, and dividends can signal 
lower probability of asset substitution as the firm may have fewer growth opportunities. We 
                                                          
9 Previous literature RQWKHGHWHUPLQDQWVRIILUPV¶VODFNe.g., Demiroglu & James, 2010; El-Gazzar & Pastena, 
2010) supports the consideration of these characteristics to capture debt contract strictness. 
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also control for volatility in performance. In addition, a higher market-to-book ratio can lead 
firms to prefer equity to debt financing.10 Finally, all models include time and industry 
dummies and the individual effect to control for unobserved heterogeneity (Și).11 
 
Results 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations, minimums, maximums, and 
correlation matrix of the variables used in the models. The variance inflation factors for all 
variables are below 5. Therefore, multicollinearity is less likely to affect our regression 
results. 
-----Insert Table 2 Here----- 
 
Table 2 also provides preliminary evidence on the differences between family and 
non-family firms regarding debt contract and firm characteristics. Panel B shows, as 
expected, that the strictness of the debt contract is lower for family firms (3.7272) than for 
non-family firms (3.9098). Also, the coverage covenant, which is the restriction imposed by 
the debtholder on a minimum coverage ratio, is less restrictive (lower values) for family firms 
(2.6504) than for non-family firms (2.8705). Consistent with prior family firm literature, 
Panel C shows that family firms have lower performance, size, risk and growth opportunities, 
and issue more debt than non-family firms. 
 
Tests for Hypotheses 1 and 2 
Table 3 presents the results of the regression analyses. Model 1 shows that family firms are 
negatively related to the DCSI (Į2 = ±0.024, p < 0.01), which supports Hypothesis 1. This 
estimate can be interpreted as family firms having a DCSI of 6.65% (i.e., [0.385±(0.385±
                                                          
10 These control variables are frequently used in capital structure research. For instance, the inclusion of ROA in 
the models enables us to capture pecking order patterns. 
11 Controlling for the individual effect is important as it captures the potential impact of personal collateral on 
contract strictness. Although we cannot measure family wealth, the propensity to use personal guarantees can be 
assumed constant over a short-time period. For instance, some family owners may be more prone than others to 
pledge their personal assets in negotiations with lenders. Such personal preferences are unlikely to change over 
time and hence are accounted for by the individual effect in the models. 
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0.024)]/(0.385±0.024)=0.0665) lower than non-family firms.12 In line with Hypothesis 2, 
family firms with more tangible assets have a lower DCSI than that of non-family firms with 
more tangible assets (Model 2, Ȗ1 = ±0.309, p < 0.01). Panel A of Figure 1 demonstrates that, 
as asset tangibility increases, DCSI of family firms decreases. Specifically, high-tangibility 
family (non-family) firms have a DCSI of 0.2845 (0.3526), indicating a 19.32% (i.e., 
[0.2845±0.3526]/0.3526=0.1932) lower DCSI for family firms than for non-family firms with 
comparable asset tangibility.13 
-----Insert Table 3 Here----- 
-----Insert Figure 1 Here----- 
 
Tests for Hypothesis 3 
Forbearing Behavior from Creditors. Hypothesis 3 proposes that, with increases in 
R&D intensity, DCSI remains stable in family firms but increases in non-family firms (Model 
3, Ȗ2 = ±0.633, p < 0.01). Panel B of Figure 1 supports the hypothesis; that is, as R&D 
intensity increases, the DCSI of non-family firms also increases, but the DCSI of family firms 
remains unchanged. Therefore, the difference in the DCSI between family and non-family 
firms is higher when R&D intensity increases. Specifically, the DCSI of high-R&D intensity 
family (non-family) firms is 0.3624 (0.4019), indicating a 10.90% (i.e., [0.4019±
0.3624]/0.3624=0.1090) higher DCSI for non-family firms than for family firms with 
comparable R&D intensity. 
Forbearing Behavior from Family Firms. Behavioral theory suggests that the distance 
from bankruptcy is a determinant of R&D investment and that companies limit risky 
investments when they are close to bankruptcy (e.g., Alessandri & Pattit, 2014). To test for 
this possibility, we investigate the effect of coverage slack on R&D intensity. Coverage slack 
                                                          
12 To compute the difference in the DCSI between family and non-family firms, we use the estimated 
coefficients on the constant and the family dummy variable obtained from Model 1 in Table 3. 
13 We rerun the analyses using the ratio of property, plant, and equipment over total assets as an alternative 
tangibility measure and including cash holdings as control variable. Overall, the findings remain qualitatively 
the same. To save space, the results are not reported but are available from the authors upon request. 
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captures the distance from violation of the debt covenant (cf. Beatty, Ramesh, & Weber, 
2002; Nash, Netter, & Poulsen, 2003): The higher the value is, the greater the slack is.14 If 
creditors are indeed concerned about underinvestment problems in family firms, higher 
coverage slack should increase ILUPV¶ R&D intensity. In addition, if Agency Problem 3 is 
lower in family firms, their R&D intensity should be less sensitive to coverage slack than that 
of non-family firms. To test for these expectations, we adopt a two-stage approach. 
In the first stage, we estimate a model to predict financial covenant slack. Following 
Demiroglu and James (2010), we use firm size, debt ratio, EBITDA scaled by sales, cash 
volatility, market-to-book ratio, the DCSI, and industry dummies as predictors. We use the 
minimum coverage ratio covenant as a proxy for financial covenant slack.15. Following El-
Gazzar and Pastena (1990), the financial covenant slack variable is defined as: 
Coverage slack = ([Actual coverage ratio ± Coverage covenant]/Coverage 
covenant)/100, (1) 
 
where the actual coverage ratio is EBITDA divided by interest expenses, and the coverage 
covenant is the restriction imposed by the bank obtained from the DealScan database.16 
In the second stage, we analyze the relation between coverage slack and R&D. The 
dependent variable of the model is R&D expenditures divided by total sales,17 which captures 
R&D investment intensity (Honoré, Munari, & de La Potterie, 2015). The main explanatory 
variable is the prediction of coverage slack from the first stage. 
                                                          
14 Negative values for coverage slack represent a covenant violation. If a covenant requires a minimum ratio, the 
YLRODWLRQRFFXUVZKHQWKHILUP¶VDFWXDOUDWLRLVORZHUWKDQWKDWVSHFLILHGLQWKHFRYHQDQW 
15 We use this covenant for two reasons. First, it appears more frequently in the DealScan database. Second, 
Demerjian and Owens (2013) show that the minimum coverage ratio covenant has only 34 definitions for 953 
covenants, suggesting it is quite homogenous. 
16 Before defining the covenant slack variable, we make some adjustments and corrections suggested by Chava 
and Roberts (2008) to account for possible refinancing, overlaps, and covenant changes over time. For example, 
one firm has an amendment on January 15, 2004 that specifies that the minimum coverage ratio should increase 
gradually from 2.25 to 3.50 until the third quarter of 2005. We use linear interpolation to estimate the quarterly 
ratios for each intervening quarter. 
17 In line with recent works (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014; Schmid et al., 2014) and to maximize the size of the 
sample, we substitute the R&D missing values with zeros. We also estimate the R&D models using R&D over 
total assets as dependent variable and the results remain qualitatively the same. To save space, the results are not 
reported but are available from the authors upon request. 
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-----Insert Table 4 Here----- 
 
Table 4 provides the results. Model 1 shows that, while higher coverage slack affects 
R&D intensity positively, this effect is less pronounced in family firms because creditors are 
FRQFHUQHG DERXW IDPLO\ ILUPV¶ XQGHULQYHVWPHQW SUREOHP regardless of their slack level. 
Figure 2 shows that, as coverage slack increases, family firm investment in R&D as a 
proportion of sales increases by 28.32% (i.e., [0.0145±0.0113]/0.0113=0.2832), suggesting 
that family firms do in fact consider coverage slack when making R&D investments. 
-----Insert Figure 2 Here----- 
 
Performance Aspiration Gap and Forbearance. R&D investments of family firms and 
their dependence on the available coverage slack might also depend on whether their 
performance is above or below historic aspiration levels (Chrisman & Patel, 2012). The 
historic performance aspiration measure LVWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQDILUP¶V52$LQ\HDUt and 
its historical performance in t±1. To ease the interpretation of the three-way interaction term 
among the family variable, coverage slack, and change in performance, we create a dummy 
variable based on the performance difference, which equals 1 if current performance is above 
the historic aspiration level, and zero otherwise. Model 2 of Table 4 presents the new 
regression results. 
Family firms with performance above aspiration levels are more likely to increase 
R&D intensity (Ȗ3 = 0.001, p < 0.01) and the desire to increase R&D is greater in family firms 
when performance is above aspirations and coverage slack is increasing (Ȗ4 = 0.046, p < 
0.01). Therefore, the joint effect of the three variables of interest (i.e., the coefficient on the 
three-way interaction term) enables us to conclude that family firms invest more in R&D 
when two conditions are met: (i) their performance follows an upward trend; and (ii) they 
have JUHDWHUµEUHDWKLQJURRP¶IURPFUHGLWRUVUHVXOWLQJIURPKLJKHUFRYHUDJHVODFN 
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Robustness Tests 
We only present here a brief summary of the findings from the additional tests. Full 
regression results are available from the authors upon request. First, given that the DCSI 
measure comprises eight components, we rerun the analyses by removing from the index one 
component at a time to rule out the possibility that one or more of the components drive the 
results. The inferences are qualitatively consistent with the main results. Second, we obtain 
similar results when we redefine the index by removing from it the amount borrowed and the 
term of the loan (and including both components as predictors) and when we use the cost of 
private debt as a proxy for contract strictness. Third, to control for firm life cycle effects, we 
manually collect the founding year of each company, define an age variable, and include it in 
the right-hand side of the models. The main conclusions of the study remain unchanged. 
Fourth, we gather new data to complement the information obtained from Anderson et al. 
(2009), and Anderson, Reeb, et al. (2012) to check whether the founder effect explains our 
empirical evidence. The lower debt contract strictness of family firms and the finding that 
creditors do not impose stricter contracts with increases in R&D are explained by family 
firms with less founder influence.18 However, both founder and non-founder family firms 
enjoy lower contract strictness as tangibility increases. Therefore, we conclude that the 
founder effect does not drive our results. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Extending past work on leverage of (González, Guzmán, Pombo, & Trujillo, 2013; Mishra & 
McConaughy, 1999) and on the different costs of debt for (Anderson et al., 2003; Boubakri & 
Ghouma, 2010) family firms and applying efficient contracting theory, we find support for 
lower debt contract strictness in family firms. The findings indirectly suggest that, for family 
                                                          
18 The percentage of founder family firms ranges between 21.60% and 31.20% of the family firm sample, 
depending on the classification criterion used. 
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firms: (i) creditors perceive lower agency costs from shareholder±creditor agency conflicts, 
especially when asset tangibility is greater; and (ii) family firms avoid investments that 
increase risk (e.g., R&D intensity) unless increasing coverage slack is present, whereas 
creditors do not increase debt contract strictness as they WUXVWWKDWIDPLO\ILUPV¶ investments 
do not increase to asset substitution levels. 
Findings related to Hypothesis 2 extend work by Delcoure (2007) on asset tangibility 
and financing constraints. Given that creditors are likely to impose less strict contracts on 
firms with more tangible assets, higher stock of tangible assets leads to greater leniency in 
debt contracts in the case of family firms. Panel B of Figure 1 is counterintuitive to traditional 
financial economics literature (Diamond, 1984; Sharpe, 1990) that suggests that the greater 
information asymmetry of family firms should increase contract strictness at a faster rate than 
that of non-family firms when R&D intensity is higher. A plausible explanation is that 
creditors may be cautious of the underinvestment problem in family firms and choose to 
forbear. We also advance prior research that reports that family firms prefer investing in 
physical assets over R&D assets (Anderson, Duru, & Reeb, 2012) by showing that, 
controlling for asset tangibility, family firms increase R&D intensity with increasing 
coverage slack (Figure 2). This result extends past works on the behavioral theory of the firm 
that suggests that family firms change R&D levels based on performance feedback and 
coverage slack (Lucas, Knoben, & Meeus, 2015). Using information on debt covenants to get 
a fine-grained slack measure, we find that creditors do not perceive agency costs as 
increasing with higher R&D intensity in family firms (Panel B of Figure 1); otherwise, 
strictness should increase with R&D intensity. 
An ancillary contribution of this work is related to the method used to test the 
hypotheses, which enables us to control for endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity. The 
use of the system generalized method of moments estimator, in contrast to an ordinary least 
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square estimator, allows us to mitigate these two problems by using instrumental variables 
and the integration of individual unobserved characteristics in the estimation strategy. 
Chua et al. (2011) find that family involvement acts as a proxy for social capital that 
improves relationships with lenders and third party guarantors, thus contributing to increase 
the amount of debt raised by the venture. Extending their work to the public firm domain, in 
later stages of the firm life cycle, family involvement continues to garner lenient debt 
covenants. Unlike new venture firms, which face hurdles in receiving debt financing, publicly 
traded family firms have comparative advantage due to their governance and strategic 
preferences. 
 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
The proposed framework has limitations that must be acknowledged. First, we draw on 
DealScan data, where covenants are coded by the data provider. Although DealScan is widely 
used (e.g., Bae & Goyal, 2009; Dichev & Skinner, 2002; Graham et al., 2008; Qian & 
Strahan, 2007), the underlying negotiation process for a debt contract between the firm and 
the creditor remains unobserved. The panel data methodology, using the generalized method 
of moments, and accounting for lagged effects of debt contract strictness allow us to control 
for several of the unobserved characteristics in this process. Based on qualitative studies on 
agency theory (e.g., Shapiro, 2005), we call for future studies to assess further the dynamics 
of debt contract negotiation in family and non-family firms. 
Second, we focus on public US firms. In addition to the limited generalizability of 
findings to non-US public family firms, the dynamics of debt covenant strictness are also 
distinct for private family firms²typically fully owned by the family²which may rely more 
on debt than their publicly traded counterparts. Future studies should assess whether 
remaining private, the founder influence, or the nature of the relationship between the family 
and creditors lead to variations in debt contract strictness of family firms. 
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The degree of socioemotional wealth invested in the company may be higher when 
owners and managers have been at the helm of the business since its foundation. Therefore, 
future research should investigate capital structure preferences and dynamics of early-stage 
family firms. Debt contract strictness is also of interest in any type of lending relationship 
(and not only in bank loans), including financing types specific to ventures, ranging from 
government loans (e.g., US Small Business Administration loans) to short-term financing. In 
this regard, previous research finds that businesses initiated by entrepreneurs frequently 
evolve into family firms (Hoy & Verser, 1994) and family firms themselves represent a 
substantial fraction of new entrepreneurial ventures (Morris, Williams, Allen, & Avila, 1997). 
Third, unfortunately we are unable to observe the rich family firm dynamics resulting 
from variations in ownership, management, and control. We caution that the dummy 
variables used in current and previous studies do not help assess multidimensional effects of 
the various family firm dimensions; however, past studies on US samples of public family 
firms have found strong correlations among these multidimensional factors. We call on future 
research to assess variations in debt preferences and in financing conditions across family 
firms based on the level of ownership and control, generational involvement, ownership 
structure, board composition, industry clock speed, and old versus new economy firms, 
among others. These are just some of the factors that may explain heterogeneity in the capital 
structure among family firms and are salient given the mixed findings on leverage in family 
businesses (Gottardo & Moisello, 2016). 
Fourth, debt covenants vary significantly across institutional contexts and can 
represent an important boundary condition for the inferences. In European or Japanese 
contexts, creditors have closer relationships with the firm, compared to the more arms-length 
relationships in the United States. Fifth, we do not distinguish between types of debt as the 
qualitative richness of relationality in debt is not available in archival sources. Although past 
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work has construed bank debt or commercial loans as relational debt (Wang & Thornhill, 
2010), the frequency, intensity, and richness of interactions are not known. Acknowledging 
David et al. (2008) finding that debt is heterogeneous, future studies should qualitatively 
assess the nature of such relational debt. Sixth, a variety of factors can also influence the 
forbearance relation between coverage slack and R&D intensity including, but not limited to, 
social capital of the family, relational aspects of lending, pyramidal holdings that provide 
indirect guarantees, and industry outlook. 
While firm characteristics such as institutional ownership or external oversight by 
second blockholders could affect our findings, the specifications and method used enable us 
to mitigate the omitted variable bias. We use a panel data estimator and our empirical models 
are dynamic as we control for the effect of past debt contract strictness. Nonetheless, we 
recognize the importance of firm governance structures, such as the board of directors and the 
existence of multiple blockholders, and future research should explore their influence on 
family firm financing. 
Finally, while personal guarantees are generally observed for private firms and small- 
and medium-sized enterprises, where family owners may leverage their social capital to 
provide family wealth as collateral, personal guarantees of concentrated shareholders are 
seldom observed for large public firms in regulated corporate debt markets. To control for 
possible related effects, our models include proxies for corporate collateral (i.e., firm size and 
asset tangibility). Unfortunately, we cannot measure personal guarantees in the available data. 
But their impact can be assumed stable over time and, consequently, is captured by the 
individual effect in the models. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Family business studies have focused on agency problems among principals, between family 
shareholders and non-family managers, and between family and non-family shareholders. We 
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explore the positive aspect of family ownership on debt contract strictness in the context of 
shareholders±creditors agency conflict. Family firms have lower strictness in debt contracts, 
and increasing asset tangibility further lowers debt strictness. Creditors do not increase debt 
contract strictness for family firms with increasing R&D intensity, and family firms do not 
increase R&D without increasing coverage slack. The findings extend our current 
understanding of debt contracts in public family firms in the United States. 
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Table 1 
Definitions and Summary Statistics of DCSI Components and Variables Operationalizations 
Panel A. Definitions of debt contract strictness index (DCSI) components 
Component Explanation and definition of dummy variables 
Amount borrowed The amount of money that has been lent by the debtholder. Equals 1 if the amount 
borrowed is higher than the sample median, zero otherwise. 
If contract is secured The contract is secured when there is a collateral (the borrower pledges some assets). 
Equals 1 if the value is higher than the median, zero otherwise. 
If it is revolver loan Revolver loans allow the company to choose how often they want to withdraw from the 
loan and at what time intervals, granting the firm more flexibility than other loans. Equals 
1 if the value is lower than the median, zero otherwise. 
Distribution method Syndicated loan is one that is provided and administrated by a group of lenders. Equals 1 
if the value is higher than the median, zero otherwise. 
Price of debt Describes the amount a borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR for each dollar drawn 
down. Equals 1 if the value is higher than the median, zero otherwise. 
Number of lenders Number of debtholders. Equals 1 if the value is higher than the median, zero otherwise. 
Maturity Number of days to give back the loan. Equals 1 if the value is lower than the median, 
zero otherwise. 
Number of covenants Number of covenants. Equals 1 if the value is higher than the median, zero otherwise. 
Panel B. Summary Statistics 
Component Mean  SD  
  Overall Between Within 
Amount borrowed 0.4911 0.4999 0.4323 0.2701 
If contract is secured  0.4577 0.4982 0.4430 0.2486 
If it is revolver loan 0.5050 0.5000 0.4126 0.3122 
Distribution method 0.7581 0.4283 0.3803 0.2231 
Price of debt 0.4985 0.5000 0.4320 0.2739 
Number of lenders 0.5009 0.5000 0.4260 0.2929 
Maturity 0.498 0.5000 0.4134 0.3041 
Number of covenants 0.1500 0.3571 0.3433 0.1468 
DCSI 3.8593 1.3928 1.2096 0.7699 
Panel C. Variable Operationalization  
Dependent variable Main analysis or 
robustness 
Description  
Debt Contract  
Strictness Index  
(DCSI) 
Main analysis Index composed by eight components (explained in Table 1), which 
ranges from zero to 8. For each component, we give the value of 1 if 
the characteristic is tight, and zero otherwise, and then we sum the 
eight values. 
 
Family firm dummy All analyses Takes the value of 1 if the company is a family firm, following the 
criteria of Anderson et al. (2009) and Anderson et al. (2012b), and 
zero otherwise. These authors define family firms as those where the 
IDPLO\IRXQGHUVRUIRXQGHUV¶GHVFHQGDQWVFontinues to maintain a 
5% or greater ownership stake. 
Moderator variables   
Asset tangibility Main analysis We follow Almeida and Campello (2007) and compute asset 
tangibility as (0.715 * accounts receivables + 0.547 * inventory + 
0.535 * PP&ENet + cash) scaled by total assets 
R&D/Sales Main analysis 5	'H[SHQGLWXUHVVFDOHGE\WKHILUP¶VWRWDOVDOHV 
R&D/Total assets Main analysis 5	'H[SHQGLWXUHVVFDOHGE\WKHILUP¶VWRWDODVVHWV 
Control variables   
ROA All analyses Net income scaled by total assets 
Size All analyses Log of total sales 
Debt All analyses Long term debt scaled by total assets 
Dividends  All analyses Cash dividends scaled by total assets 
Risk All analyses 6WGHYRIWKHILUP¶VVWRFNUHWXUQVGXULQJWKHTXDUWHU 
Market-to-book  All analyses (Market value of equity + total debt) scaled by total assets 
Additional variable: 
Coverage Slack 
Robustness ([Actual coverage ratio ± Coverage covenant]/Coverage 
covenant)/100 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Analyses: Main Summary Statistics and Difference of Mean Tests 
Panel A. Summary statistics and correlation matrix 
Variables Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. DCSI 3.8593 1.3927 .0000 8.0000            
2. Family .2767 .4474 .0000 1.0000 ±.0586***           
3. Asset tangibility .3928 .1359 .0329 .8175 ±.1821*** ±.1196***          
4. R&D/Sales .0009 .0256 .0000 1.7053 .0009 ±.0176** ±.0275***         
5. R&D/Total assets .0001 .0029 .0000 .1598 ±.0072 ±.0148* ±.0223*** .9198***        
6. Coverage slack .0316 .0573 ±.0422 .9485 ±.1887*** .0144* .1897*** .0342*** .0248***       
7. ROA .0061 .0442 ±.7013 1.8991 ±.0854*** ±.0404*** .0632*** ±.0599*** ±.0664*** .1524***      
8. Size 5.9095 1.2494 1.4002 10.2757 .1080*** ±.2389*** .0418*** .0064 .0083 .0296*** .1010***     
9. Debt .2876 .1786 .0000 .9484 .2295*** .0420*** ±.2337*** ±.0056 ±.0133 ±.4390*** ±.1355*** ±.1534***    
10. Dividends .0002 .0038 .0000 .4290 .0174** ±.0082 .0105 .0003 ±.0000 ±.0244*** ±.0273*** ±.0408*** .0370***   
11. Risk 1.8334 1.6962 .0000 15.4935 ±.0687*** ±.0230*** .0626 ±.0030 ±.0063 .1285*** .1062*** .1281*** ±.1296*** ±.0266***  
12. Market-to-book 1.2429 .6576 .0067 5.9407 ±.1569*** ±.0623*** .0247*** .0239*** .0425*** .3154*** .2382*** .0250*** ±.0934*** ±.0317*** .1955*** 
Panel B. Differences of mean tests of main variables: Family versus non-family firms 
 All firms Family Non-family t-statistic 
(Non-family±Family) 
No. Obs. 14,904 4,125 10,779  
DCSI 3.8593 3.7272 3.9098 7.1711*** 
Asset tangibility 0.3928 0.3666 0.4029 14.7041*** 
R&D/Sales 0.0009 0.0002 0.0012 2.1469** 
R&D/Total assets 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 1.8128** 
Coverage slack 0.0316 0.0330 0.0311 ±1.7634** 
Coverage ratio 12.2778 11.8851 12.4281 1.6701** 
Coverage covenant 2.8096 2.6504 2.8705 13.5290*** 
Panel C. Differences of mean tests of other variables: Family versus non-family firms 
No. Obs. 14,904 4,125 10,779  
ROA 0.0061 0.0032 0.0072 4.9354*** 
Size 5.9095 5.4271 6.0942 30.0301*** 
Debt 0.2876 0.2998 0.2830 ±5.1318*** 
Dividends 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 1.0059 
Risk 1.8334 1.7702 1.8576 2.8140*** 
Market-to-book 1.2429 1.1767 1.2682 7.6180*** 
The percentage of family firms in the sample is 27.68%. ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.10. 
31 
Table 3 
Debt Contract Strictness Index and Family Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: DCSI DCSI DCSI DCSI 
Controls:     
DCSI (t±1) 0.896*** 0.897*** 0.896*** 0.897*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA ±0.196*** ±0.189*** ±0.195*** ±0.195*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) 
Size 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Debt 0.115*** 0.121*** 0.118*** 0.125*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Dividends ±0.080* ±0.094* ±0.024 ±0.126** 
 (0.043) (0.049) (0.034) (0.050) 
Risk ±0.002*** ±0.003*** ±0.002*** ±0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market-to-book ±0.051*** ±0.048*** ±0.049*** ±0.048*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Independent variables:     
Family ±0.024*** 0.095*** ±0.023*** 0.095*** 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.005) 
Asset tangibility ±0.079*** 0.005 ±0.092*** 0.010** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
R&D/Sales 0.573*** 0.588*** 0.613*** 0.630*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Interaction effects:     
Family * Asset tangibility  ±0.309***  ±0.302*** 
  (0.014)  (0.012) 
Family * R&D/Sales   ±0.633*** ±0.643*** 
   (0.036) (0.035) 
Cons. 0.385*** 0.350*** 0.386*** 0.343*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Specification tests:     
z1 2,700,000 (10) 6,800,000 (11) 4,700,000 (11) 2,900,000 (12) 
z2 9,809.09 (8) 5,548.67 (8) 7,548.11 (8) 5,008.23 (8) 
z3 878.21 (7) 533.72 (7) 1,175.71 (7) 807.54 (7) 
m1 ±16.45 ±16.45 ±16.44 ±16.45 
m2 ±0.30 ±0.31 ±0.30 ±0.32 
Hansen (p-value) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
Notes: System GMM regression results. Lags from tí1 to tí3 are used as instruments in the equations in 
differences for all the right-hand side variables (except for the lagged dependent variable, DCSI, which is 
assigned lags from tí2 to tí4) and only one instrument is used for the equations in levels. All models include 
time and industry dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses. N= 14,904. 
***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.10. 
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Table 4 
Effect of Coverage Slack on R&D Intensity across Family and Non-Family Firms 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: R&D Intensity R&D Intensity 
Controls:   
R&D/Sales (t±1) 0.159*** 0.161*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA ±0.036*** ±0.034*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Size 0.000*** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Debt 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Dividends 0.015*** 0.012*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) 
Risk ±0.000*** ±0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Market-to-book ±0.000** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset tangibility ±0.034*** ±0.024*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Independent variables:   
Family ±0.001*** ±0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Coverage slack 0.045*** 0.059*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Performance aspiration gap  ±0.000 
  (0.000) 
Interaction effects:   
Family * Coverage slack ±0.017*** ±0.041*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Performance aspiration gap *   ±0.047*** 
Coverage slack  (0.001) 
Family * Performance   0.001*** 
aspiration gap  (0.000) 
Family * Coverage slack *   0.046*** 
Performance aspiration gap  (0.001) 
Cons. 0.013*** 0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Specification tests:   
z1 420,000 (11) 40,857.46 (15) 
z2 2,580.72 (8) 735.31 (8) 
z3 884.96 (7) 625.89 (7) 
m1 ±1.89 -1.89 
m2 ±0.73 -0.74 
Hansen (p-value) (1.000) (1.000) 
Notes: System GMM regression results. Lags from tí1 to tí3 are used as instruments in the equations in 
differences for all the right-hand side variables (except for the lagged dependent variable, DCSI, which is 
assigned lags from tí2 to tí4) and only one instrument is used for the equations in levels. All models include 
time and industry dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses. N= 14,904. 
***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.10. 
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FIGURE 1 
Moderation Effects in DCSI Model 
Panel A. Moderation effects of asset tangibility 
 
Panel B. Moderation effects of R&D intensity 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
Moderation Effect of Coverage Slack in R&D Model 
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